A bitter personal struggle between two powerful figures in the world of terrorism has broken out, forcing their followers to choose sides. This battle is not being fought in the rugged no man¹s land on the Pakistan-Afghan border. It is a contest reverberating inside the Beltway between two of America¹s leading theorists on terrorism and how to fight it, two men who hold opposing views on the very nature of the threat.
In a nutsheel: “big” al Qaeda is still a major factor or it isn’t.
The problem with putting all your eggs into one theoretical terrorism basket is that, unlike proving theories in a lab, you lack the time and data to prove your theory in a meaningful timeframe … oh, and the fact that while you quibble people continue to die.
You cannot deny the power or at least the influence of old-school AQ; if they were not a factor, you wouldn’t have people wetting themselves every time the old man put out a new audio or video. As with anything that resembles a hierarchy however, there are limits to what can be accomplished when you are fighting time and distance before you can fight your enemy. In fact, the more distant and disconnected core al Qaeda is, the more likely everything is going to look like “a bunch of guys” because – like Kaiser Soze – almost no one is ever going to be sure who the heck they’re working for.
On the flip side, Sageman’s “just a bunch of guys” approach does not come without evidence, but adherents who make comments like “leaderless things don’t produce big outcomes” has not been paying attention to things like, oh, anything dealing with social networking, this thing called Wiki (or Intelli) pedia, or the data and discussion in a book you might have heard about.
Glomming on to the ascendant theory is indeed an issue, and anyone who says they’re not tweaking their mission statements and statements of work to help bolster their positions and expand their rice bowls is making statements inconsistent with the truth. The problem with jumping from theory to theory of course is that you end up spending precious little time dealing with real, actual problems. In keeping with the lab analogy, when most of your day is spent filling out paperwork and delivering PPT in order to justify your order of test tubes and ager plates, that’s time and resources you’re not putting into research.
FWIW, our strategy to combat terrorism should not be theory-chasing, but focusing on commonalities and neutralizing their impact on people and society. I don’t care who issued your orders, the steps necessary to affect and effective terrorist attack are the same. Who issued the orders means less and less if you can develop the means to minimize the impact of their tactics. Look past my inelegant language and appreciate the sentiment as it is intended: when terrorism can only produce nuisance, not chaos, then we have in effect won.