I have said as much before, though in a more disjointed and in-eloquent fashion. I take issue with a few points but I don’t want to detract from the over-arching point: that real intelligence work does not mirror intelligence in pop culture or whatever your fantasy is, is a consumer’s problem, not an intelligence failure.
That the community does not lobby – education, not influence – both unsophisticated policy makers as well as the public it serves has long been a sore point in this quarter. One need only look at the recent Air Force commercials, or “Army of One” ads in the recent past to demonstrate that one can communicate a sense of mission importance, complexity, intensity, and urgency without revealing anything sensitive (that much of what is considered tradecraft is widely known to anyone wiling to do the research notwithstanding).
I try to instill in my students a sense of … “optimistic dismay” at the fact that no matter how much rigor you put into the task, no matter how choice your info, you are rarely going to be able to forecast a future state with anything approaching reliability as the term is commonly understood. Not being omniscient an analyst cannot blame himself if he does everything right but comes up short; the failure is in not communicating the fact that “intelligence” is the same sort of data-gathering, critical-thinking exercise anyone involved in policy- or decision-making performs every day (the big difference being the source of information used).
The least sensitive and largely prosaic aspect of intelligence work could stand more than a little openness and exposure; both as a check on intellectual tunnel vision and undue political influence, but also as a way to build public confidence that what is going on behind closed doors is hardly nefarious and largely familiar to anyone who works in a cube farm.
Moving to a dissemination model that eschews “publication” and relies on dynamically, communally-built findings and delivered orally in person is arguably the best way to overcome many problems associated with consumers not understanding or misusing intelligence. Nothing is going to stop leaks (save for serious investigations and public trials) but making it easier to track access to content is one way to dissuade more casual violators of non-disclosure agreements.
Absent a dramatic change of leadership at the agency-level, don’t expect much to change. There is too much of a perceived advantage in keeping things quiet and secret. The folly of that approach however, continues to be demonstrated daily. In a world awash in information and flooded with analysts as good as you’ll find anywhere, shortcomings in community performance will eventually call into question the need for an info-centric enterprise that fails to exceed the performance of unindoctrinated amateurs.
Comments (2)
Michael, this is an interesting post but a slightly frustrating one. I gather that you oppose certain types of secrecy (which are “folly”), but that you find value in other types of secrecy (eschew publication in order to help educate consumers). But you don’t clearly say which approach you think should apply in which circumstances.
Currently, CIA says that even open source analyses must be “treated as copyrighted” even when they are not. Does that seem reasonable to you?
Or a slightly harder case: Mark Lowenthal insists that all analytical products such as NIEs should be presumptively withheld. Is that what you are endorsing?
I would have said that at least the key judgments of NIEs are precisely the kinds of intelligence products that should be disclosed. They address subjects of policy significance, yet they are several steps removed from actual sources or methods.
Instead of educating consumers about intelligence in secret, why not do more to educate the public — in public. If necessary to foster internal deliberation and assessment, release to the public could be postponed for 30 days. Or something like that.
Posted by Steven Aftergood![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://haftofthespear.com/nav-commenters.gif)
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May 26, 2008 3:12 PM
Posted on May 26, 2008 15:12
Steve: It would be helpful to be more coherent, no? I blame blogging while watching American Gladiators. ;-)
More to the point:
I do not swallow the idea the folks like Mark, Fingar, Kerr, etc. promulgate; that analysts would do/say things differently if their work was made public. I’ve had my work leaked and I did nothing differently afterwards. You start second guessing where something is going to end up, you’ve just punted your primary responsibility. What the NYT would say about my work (or any collaboration I was a part of) was never discussed. As far as I’m concerned they’re making up that boogie man.
I think things that legitimately deserve protection via the classification system (actual sources and methods, analytic findings dealing with immediately operational matters) should be sacrosanct. In legit cases (more on that in a sec) people who are doing good things for us will die. To the extent that this is a life or death business, OK, but there has to be some hope of getting out of crucible alive or we might as well give up on the espionage business.
Illegitimate use of the classification system to cover up intentional errors or malfeasance is unsat as far as I am concerned. It would help if the DNI would boost the ranks of classification officers and elevate them to something akin to IG status, where their decisions could (in theory) not be influenced by the machinations of those with a vested interest in avoiding sunlight.
CIA (and other agencies) opinions of OSINT just go to show they still don’t get it. Giving an analyst a ‘Net connection doesn’t give you an OSINT capability. You could kill two birds (educating the public, boosting confidence in analysis) by making “finished” OSINT publicly available (letting any swinging Richard into the OSC’s web space would be a bit much) but that would require insight and fortitude that is apparently lacking. You think you’re the premiere source of analysis in the country? Turn out some sourced products and let’s compare it with the work of both Pros (academics, think tankers) and Ams (pajamahadeen).
My old shop used to put out glossy color full-page pamphlets about what (functionally, methodologically) we did for a living; CIA used to have a booklet titled something along the lines of “Intelligence for Consumers” that laid out from soup to nuts the community, the intel cycle, etc. We need a lot more of that and not just targeted to the new crop of appointees that show up every four years. They ought to be on every agency web site, every library, mailed free to anyone who asks for a copy. You’re not exposing people to anything they can’t get if they didn’t enroll in an undergrad or grad school class on intel fundamentals (but you save a couple grand in tuition). Secrets should be kept, but intelligence shouldn’t be feared.
Posted by Michael Tanji![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://haftofthespear.com/nav-commenters.gif)
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May 26, 2008 9:17 PM
Posted on May 26, 2008 21:17